Philosophers against “truth”: The cases of Harr and Laudan

Abstract The criticisms levelled at the notion of truth by an anti?realist (Larry Laudan) and an entity?realist (Rom Harré) are critically examined. The upshot of the discussion will be that whilst neither of the two anti?truth philosophers have succeeded in establishing their cases against truth, for entity?realists to reject the notion of truth is to throw out the baby with the bath water: entity?realism without the notion of correspondence truth will degenerate into anti?realism
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DOI 10.1080/02698599508573523
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Rom Harré (1995). Realism and an Ontology of Powerful Particulars. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (3):285-300.

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