Laguna 8:145-158 (2001)

Authors
Miguel Angel Quintana Paz
Universidad Europea Miguel De Cervantes
Abstract
Modernity developed two conceptions of “nation”: “political nation” (grounded on the free will of subjects) and “cultural nation” (grounded on an objective entity, like culture, race, etc). But both axes of justification, the Subject and the Object, have recently suffered hard attacks from philosophies like Hermeneutics, which reveal heavy contradictions in them if they are to function as “grounds” of the “nation”. Nevertheless, no radical alternative to the concept of “nation” nor to these ways of grounding it seems nowadays plausible. The hermeneutical approach that we propose is, then, to keep them, but in a verwordenem (weakened) sense, as termini towards which (not from which) making dialogical explanations about “nation”. In such a way, once we have excluded Modern fundamentals, a non fundament(al)ist way of thinking about it would favour the “reduction of violence” that hermeneutical practical philosophy adopts as its keynote.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Libros de la nación polaca desde el principio del mundo hasta el martirio de la nación polaca.Adam Mickiewicz - 1960 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 7:201-208.
Pensar frente al exceso.Daniel Innerarity Grau - 1997 - Diálogo Filosófico 37:63-72.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-24

Total views
145 ( #69,984 of 2,433,554 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #31,019 of 2,433,554 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes