Medicine, lies and deceptions

Journal of Medical Ethics 27 (2):130-134 (2001)
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Abstract

This article offers a qualified defence of the view that there is a moral difference between telling lies to one's patients, and deceiving them without lying. However, I take issue with certain arguments offered by Jennifer Jackson in support of the same conclusion. In particular, I challenge her claim that to deny that there is such a moral difference makes sense only within a utilitarian framework, and I cast doubt on the aptness of some of her examples of non-lying deception. But I argue that lies have a greater tendency to damage trust than does non-lying deception, and suggest that since many doctors do believe there is a moral boundary between the two types of deception, encouraging them to violate that boundary may have adverse general effects on their moral sensibilities

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References found in this work

On telling patients the truth.Roger Higgs - 1985 - In Michael Lockwood (ed.), Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine. Oxford University Press.

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