Abstract

This introduction to the philosophy of science includes six chapters, each taking up a single problem—though the last four constitute something of a package: three attempts to establish Schlesinger’s criterion of confirmability, four applies it to non-confirmable sentences in such a way as to provide an alternative to the Wittgensteinian "received view" about the meaningless of self-referring sentences; in the process Schlesinger defends a version of neo-verificationism which, in five and six, he attempts to show is nontrivial by applying it to the discussion of the nature of time and of determinism. To complete the list, chapter two discusses confirmation and parsimony ; and chapter one is introductory, discussing Niced’s criterion and Hempel’s paradox in terms of "the most simple type of generalization... ‘All ravens are black'... found mainly in elementary science or commonsense, prescientific reasoning".