Colloquium 2 How to Argue about Aristotle about Practical Reason

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 35 (1):31-58 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper, I consider Aristotle’s views in relation to the Humean theory of motivation. I distinguish three principles which HTM is committed to: the ‘No Besires’ principle, the ‘Motivation Out—Desire In’ principle, and the ‘Desire Out—Desire In’ principle. To reject HTM, one only needs to reject one of these principles. I argue that while it is plausible to think that Aristotle accepts the first two principles, there are some grounds for thinking that he might reject the third.

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Giles Pearson
University of Bristol

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