"How to Think Several Thoughts at Once: Content Plurality in Mental Action"

In Michael Brent & Lisa Miracchi Titus, Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 31-60 (2019)
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Abstract

Basic actions are those intentional actions performed not by doing any other kind of thing intentionally. Complex actions involve doing one kind of thing intentionally by doing another kind of thing intentionally. There are both basic and complex mental actions. Some complex mental actions have a striking feature that has not been previously discussed: they have several distinct contents at once. This chapter introduces and explains this feature, here called “content plurality.” This chapter also argues for the philosophical significance of this feature. The existence of content plurality offers a new explanation of transparent self-knowledge and suggests a new theory of inference. It also opens up a new conception of the relation between decisions to act and judgments about what ought to be done.

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Antonia Peacocke
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.
How to judge intentionally.Antonia Peacocke - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):330-339.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action.Matthew Soteriou - 2013 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
The logical form of action sentences.Donald Davidson - 1966 - In Nicholas Rescher, The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 81--95.

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