European Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):375–397 (2002)
It is just over fifty years since the publication of Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. That paper expresses a broad vision of the system of relations between meaning, experience, and the rational formation of belief. The deepest challenges the paper poses come not from the detailed argument of its first four sections – formidable though that is – but from the visionary material in its last two sections.1 It is this visionary material that is likely to force the reader to revise, to deepen, or to rethink her position on fundamental issues about the relations between meaning, experience, rationality, and, above all, the a priori. Does what is right in Quine’s argument exclude any rationalist view of these relations? How should a rationalist view be formulated? Those are the questions I will be addressing. I start with the critical part of this task, a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of Quine’s vision. Drawing on the constraints emerging from that critical discussion, I will then turn to the positive task of articulating and defending a rival conception. The rival conception can be described as a Generalized Rationalism
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Moran on Agency and Self-Knowledge.Lucy F. O'Brien - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):391-401.
Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force.Lucy F. O'Brien - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580–601.
Self-Knowledge, Agency and Force.Lucy O'Brien - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580-601.
Consequences of Pragmatic Conceptualism: On the Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence.Damiano Canale - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (2):171-186.
Similar books and articles
On the Reliability of Science: The Critical Rationalist Version.J. Agassi - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (1):100-115.
Meaning Rationalism, a Priori, and Transparency of Content.Tadeusz Szubka - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):491-503.
Moral Rationalism and Moral Commitment.James Doyle - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):1-22.
Methodological Objectivism and Critical Rationalist ’Induction’.Alfred Schramm - 2006 - In Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford & David Miller (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume Ii. Ashgate.
Naturalized Epistemology and Epistemic Evaluation.Christopher Hookway - 1994 - Inquiry 37 (4):465 – 485.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads67 ( #77,276 of 2,158,177 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #195,104 of 2,158,177 )
How can I increase my downloads?