William Peden
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Many philosophers argue that Keynes’s concept of the “weight of arguments” is an important aspect of argument appraisal. The weight of an argument is the quantity of relevant evidence cited in the premises. However, this dimension of argumentation does not have a received method for formalisation. Kyburg has suggested a measure of weight that uses the degree of imprecision in his system of “Evidential Probability” to quantify weight. I develop and defend this approach to measuring weight. I illustrate the usefulness of this measure by employing it to develop an answer to Popper’s Paradox of Ideal Evidence.
Keywords Henry Kyburg  John Maynard Keynes  Keynes  Imprecise Probability  Weight of Evidence  Weight of Argument  Formal Epistemology  Evidential Probability  Paradox of Ideal Evidence  Karl Popper
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References found in this work BETA

Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press.
Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-186.

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