Authors
Rik Peels
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief and I argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that believing at will is possible, namely that mind-reading is impossible, in TDB cases, one's belief is caused by one's desire, in TDB scenarios, one chooses not a belief but something else, TDB cases are reducible to Feldman cases, and that if truth depends on belief, we are on the road to a regress. Of course, TDB scenarios hardly, if ever, occur in real life. For three reasons, they are nonetheless important. First, they show that the thesis that it is conceptually impossible to believe at will is simply false. Second, they provide us with an imp..
Keywords Bernard Williams  Conceptual Truth  Doxastic Involuntarism  Psychological Truth  Self-Fulfilling Beliefs  Truth Depends on Belief
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Reprint years 2015
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2014.974631
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References found in this work BETA

Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Responsibility for Believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.

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Citations of this work BETA

Believing Intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.
Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394.
Religious Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2019 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.

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