Journal of Philosophy 115 (3):141-157 (2018)

Authors
Abstract
In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not be indexed to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief. This shift is problematic for several prominent approaches to the theory of knowledge, including virtue reliabilism and proper functionalism (as normally conceived). The view that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief is better able to accommodate the shift in question.
Keywords Knowledge  Reliabilism  Epistemic Luck  Anti-Luck Epistemology  Virtue Epistemology  Normality  Epistemic Indexing  Extended Epistemology  Strange and Fleeting Processes  Social Epistemology
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil201811539
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

View all 43 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (8):405-429.
A Dilemma for Globalized Safety.Bin Zhao - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):249-261.
Better Virtuous Than Safe.Haicheng Zhao - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):6969-6991.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
When Is A Belief True Because Of Luck?Preston Greene - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):465-475.
Reliabilism and Safety.Kelly Becker - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (5):691-704.
Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise.John Greco - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):463-479.
Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues.Guy Axtell - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 158--177.
Epistemic Entitlement and Luck.Sandy Goldberg - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.
Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Fake Barns and False Dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
Knowledge, Luck and Lotteries.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-09-19

Total views
612 ( #13,671 of 2,518,488 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
61 ( #13,060 of 2,518,488 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes