Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2461-2485 (2016)

Authors
Rik Peels
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
This paper assesses five main empirical scientific arguments against the reliability of belief formation on the basis of introspecting phenomenal states. After defining ‘reliability’ and ‘introspection’, I discuss five arguments to the effect that phenomenal states are more elusive than we usually think: the argument on the basis of differences in introspective reports from differences in introspective measurements; the argument from differences in reports about whether or not dreams come in colours; the argument from the absence of a correlation between visual imagery ability and the performance on certain cognitive tasks; the argument from our unawareness of our capacity of echolocation; the argument from inattentional blindness and change blindness. I argue that the experiments on which these arguments are based do not concern belief formation on the basis of introspection in the first place or fail to show that it is unreliable, even when limited to introspection of phenomenal states.
Keywords Belief formation  Introspection  Phenomenal states  Reliability
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0623-5
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References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It.John B. Watson - 1913 - Psychological Review 101 (2):248-253.

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Citations of this work BETA

What’s so Bad About Scientism?Moti Mizrahi - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (4):351-367.
Ten Reasons to Embrace Scientism.Rik Peels - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 63:11-21.
More in Defense of Weak Scientism.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (4):7-25.
In Defense of Weak Scientism: A Reply to Brown.Moti Mizrahi - 2017 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (2):9-22.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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