Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of what is Said

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):65-81 (2018)
Andrew Peet
University of Oslo
This article discusses the following question: what epistemic relation must audiences bear to the content of assertions in order to gain testimonial knowledge? There is a brief discussion of why this issue is of importance, followed by two counterexamples to the most intuitive answer: that in order for an audience to gain testimonial knowledge that p they must know that the speaker has asserted p. It is then suggested that the argument generalises and can be made to work on different sets of assumptions about the conditions for knowledge, and the conditions under which a proposition is asserted.
Keywords Testimonial Knowledge  Communication  Knowledge of What is Said
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/papq.12137
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Literal Meaning.François Recanati - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.

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Knowledge-Yielding Communication.Andrew Peet - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

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