Philosophia 40 (4):741-750 (2012)

Authors
Rik Peels
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
In this paper, I provide a defence of the New View, on which ignorance is lack of true belief rather than lack of knowledge. Pierre Le Morvan has argued that the New View is untenable, partly because it fails to take into account the distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. I argue that propositional ignorance is just a subspecies of factive ignorance and that all the work that needs to be done can be done by using the concept of factive ignorance. I also defend two arguments of mine in favour of the New View against Le Morvan’s criticisms. As to the Linguistic Argument, I point out that the intuitions of the adherent of the New View about cases of true belief that fall short of knowledge are really intuitions about factive rather than propositional ignorance. As to the Excuse Argument, I argue that true belief is exculpatorily relevant: a true belief in a proposition p , where disbelief that p or suspension on p would provide at least a partial excuse, is relevant in that it renders one blameworthy for one’s action, unless further excuses hold. Finally, I reply to two closely related objections that might be levelled against the New View, namely that it seems false that one can reduce one’s ignorance by arbitrarily believing as many propositions as possible and that it seems false that an intellectually conscientious and critical person is more ignorant than an intellectually sloppy and credulous person just because the latter has more true beliefs
Keywords Excuse argument  Ignorance  Lack of knowledge  Lack of true belief  Linguistic argument  New view  Standard view
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9364-7
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References found in this work BETA

What is Ignorance?Rik Peels - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):57-67.
On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels.Pierre LeMorvan - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):335-344.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Logic for Factive Ignorance.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - forthcoming - Synthese 198 (6):5917-5928.
Truth and Ignorance.Brent G. Kyle - 2020 - Synthese (8):1-24.
When Ignorance Excuses.Pierre Le Morvan - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):22-31.

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