Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265 (2010)

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Abstract
What, according to proponents of doxastic deontologism, is responsible belief? In this paper, we examine two proposals. Firstly, that responsible belief is blameless belief (a position we call DDB) and, secondly, that responsible belief is praiseworthy belief (a position we call DDP). We consider whether recent arguments in favor of DDP, mostly those recently offered by Brian Weatherson, stand up to scrutiny and argue that they do not. Given other considerations in favor of DDP, we conclude that the deontologist should maintain that doxastic responsibility is a concept about freedom from appropriate blame.
Keywords Responsible Belief  Blameless Belief  Praiseworthy Belief
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil2010107519
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A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.
How to Be an Epistemic Consequentialist.Daniel J. Singer - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):580-602.
The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).
Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief.Rik Peels & Anthony Booth - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):75-88.

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