Abstract
Sharon Street has argued that we should reject theism because we can accept it only at the cost of having good reason to doubt the reliability of our judgments as to what moral reasons there are. The success of her argument depends on the assumption that no realist account of normative reasons that validates commonsense morality has a tenable secular epistemology. I argue that even given this assumption Street’s argument does not succeed.
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-018-9696-8
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A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

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