A case of confusing probability and confirmation

Synthese 184 (1):101-107 (2012)
Jeanne Peijnenburg
University of Groningen
Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed
Keywords Coherentism  Probability  Confirmation  Conjunction fallacy
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9692-8
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A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.Tomoji Shogenji - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):613-616.
A Reductio of Coherentism.Tom Stoneham - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):254–257.

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