Synthese 181 (1):113 - 124 (2011)
From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form 'x is probable' only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis's idea, calling it "a remnant of rationalism". The last move in this debate was a challenge by Lewis, defying Reichenbach to produce a regress of probability values that yields a number other than zero. Reichenbach never took up the challenge, but we will meet it on his behalf, as it were. By presenting a series converging to a limit, we demonstrate that x can have a definite and computable probability, even if its justification consists of an infinite number of steps. Next we show the invalidity of a recent riposte of foundationalists that this limit of the series can be the ground of justification. Finally we discuss the question where justification can come from if not from a ground
|Keywords||Foundationalism Reichenbach Probability|
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Citations of this work BETA
The Consistency of Probabilistic Regresses: Some Implications for Epistemological Infinitism. [REVIEW]Frederik Herzberg - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):371-382.
The Dialectics of Infinitism and Coherentism: Inferential Justification Versus Holism and Coherence.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):701-723.
The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (3):347-353.
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