On poor and not so poor thought experiments. A reply to Daniel Cohnitz

Abstract
We have never entirely agreed with Daniel Cohnitz on the status and rôle of thought experiments. Several years ago, enjoying a splendid lunch together in the city of Ghent, we cheerfully agreed to disagree on the matter; and now that Cohnitz has published his considered opinion of our views, we are glad that we have the opportunity to write a rejoinder and to explicate some of our disagreements. We choose not to deal here with all the issues that Cohnitz raises, but rather to restrict ourselves to three specific points
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References found in this work BETA
When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones?Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2003 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):305-322.
Galileo and Prior Philosophy.David Atkinson - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):115-136.
Poor Thought Experiments? A Comment on Peijnenburg and Atkinson.Daniel Cohnitz - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):373 - 392.

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