Rational action entails rational desire: A critical review of Searle's rationality in action

Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):124 – 138 (2003)
Abstract
In this paper I contest Searle's thesis that desire-independent reasons for action - 'reasons that are binding on a rational agent, regardless of desires and dispositions in his motivational set' - are inherent in the concept of rationality. Following Searle's procedure, I first address his argument that altruistic reasons for action inhere in the concept of rationality, and then examine his argument for his more general thesis. I conclude that a viable theory of rational action would be centered, not on the concept of desire-independent reasons, but rather on the concept of rational desire.
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DOI 10.1080/10002003058538744
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The Chinese Rune Argument.Barry Smith - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-74.

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