Conceptualism and the (supposed) non-transitivity of colour indiscriminability

Philosophical Studies 134 (2):211 - 234 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have adopted in response to the familiar ‘fineness of grain’ objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call the indiscriminability claim seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim –the claim that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive –entail a further, suspicious-looking claim that I call the problematic claim. My argument then splits into two parts. In the first part, I show why the conceptualist does indeed need to reject the problematic claim. Given that this claim is jointly entailed by the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim, the conceptualist is then left with a straight choice: reject the indiscriminability claim, or reject the non-transitivity claim. In the second part, I then explain why the conceptualist should choose the latter option
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-5338-y
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua.Diana Raffman - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309-322.

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