Conceptualism and the problem of illusory experience

Acta Analytica 22 (3):169-182 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX


According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we possess concepts for all the objects, properties, and relations which feature in our experiences. Richard Heck has recently argued that the phenomenon of illusory experience provides us with conclusive reasons to reject this view. In this paper, I examine Heck’s argument, I explain why I think that Bill Brewer’s conceptualist response to it is ineffective, and I then outline an alternative conceptualist response which I myself endorse. My argument turns on the fact that both Heck, in constructing his objection to conceptualism, and Brewer, in responding to it, miss a crucial distinction between perceptual demonstrative concepts of objects, on the one hand, and perceptual demonstrative concepts of properties, on the other.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,592

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Demonstrative concepts without reidentification.Philippe Chuard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.
Concepts and Imagery in Episodic Memory.James Genone - 2006 - Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1-2):95-107.
Empirical concepts and the content of experience.Hannah Ginsborg - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):349-372.
Perception and conceptual content.Alex Byrne - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
Concepts, Attention, and Perception.Charles Pelling - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (2):213-242.


Added to PP

82 (#176,347)

6 months
2 (#528,188)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Charlie Pelling
University of Reading (PhD)

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 15 references / Add more references