Conceptualism and the problem of illusory experience

Acta Analytica 22 (3):169-182 (2007)

Authors
Charlie Pelling
University of Reading (PhD)
Abstract
According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we possess concepts for all the objects, properties, and relations which feature in our experiences. Richard Heck has recently argued that the phenomenon of illusory experience provides us with conclusive reasons to reject this view. In this paper, I examine Heck’s argument, I explain why I think that Bill Brewer’s conceptualist response to it is ineffective, and I then outline an alternative conceptualist response which I myself endorse. My argument turns on the fact that both Heck, in constructing his objection to conceptualism, and Brewer, in responding to it, miss a crucial distinction between perceptual demonstrative concepts of objects, on the one hand, and perceptual demonstrative concepts of properties, on the other.
Keywords Conceptualism  Demonstrative  Concept  Reference  Experience  Illusory  Colour
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-007-0001-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 40,131
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Demonstrative Concepts Without Reidentification.Philippe Chuard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.
Perception and Conceptual Content.Alex Byrne - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience.Hannah Ginsborg - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):349-372.
Concepts and Imagery in Episodic Memory.James Genone - 2006 - Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1/2):95-107.
Concepts, Attention, and Perception.Charles Pelling - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (2):213-242.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
54 ( #141,460 of 2,237,181 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #379,590 of 2,237,181 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature