Characterizing hallucination epistemically

Synthese 178 (3):437 - 459 (2011)
According to the epistemic theory of hallucination, the fundamental psychological nature of a hallucinatory experience is constituted by its being 'introspectively indiscriminable', in some sense, from a veridical experience of a corresponding type. How is the notion of introspective indiscriminability to which the epistemic theory appeals best construed? Following M. G. F. Martin, the standard assumption is that the notion should be construed in terms of negative epistemics: in particular, it is assumed that the notion should be explained in terms of the impossibility that a hallucinator might possess a certain type of knowledge on a certain basis. I argue that the standard assumption is mistaken. I argue that the relevant notion of introspective indiscriminability is better construed in terms of positive epistemics: in particular, I argue that the notion is better explained by reference to the fact that it would be rational for a hallucinator positively to make a certain type of judgement, were that judgement made on a certain basis
Keywords Hallucination  Perception  Experience  Naive  Realism  Disjunctivism  Knowledge  Judgement
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9651-4
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An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - Oxford University Press.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination.William C. Fish - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 144--167.

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