American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):95 - 104 (2009)
Properly understood, content internalism is the thesis that any difference between the representational contents of two individuals' mental states reduces to a difference in those individuals' intrinsic properties. Some of the strongest arguments against internalism turn on the possibility for two "doppelgangers" –- perfect physical and phenomenal duplicates -– to differ with respect to the contents of those of their mental states that they can express using terms such as "I," "here," and "now." In this paper, I grant the stated possibility, but deny that it poses any threat to internalism. Despite their similarities, doppelgangers differ in some of their intrinsic properties, and it is to such intrinsic differences that differences of indexical content reduce.
|Keywords||internalism mental representation indexicality|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Sensorama: A Phenomenalist Analysis of Spacetime and Its Contents.Michael Pelczar - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
Similar books and articles
On the Metaphysics of Internalism and Externalism.Alberto Voltolini - 2005 - Disputatio 18 (2):1 - 24.
The Good, the Bad, and the Irrational: Three Views of Mental Content.Andrew E. Newman - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):95-106.
Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content.Keith Butler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.
Two Grades of Internalism (Pass and Fail).Andrew E. Newman - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):153-169.
On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
Mental Content and External Representations: Internalism, Anti-Internalism.David Houghton - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):159-77.
Tim Crane on the Internalism-Externalism Debate.Ana Gavran - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):207-218.
Reconciling Justificatory Internalism and Content Externalism.Chris Tillman - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):419-440.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads119 ( #41,599 of 2,178,245 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #316,504 of 2,178,245 )
How can I increase my downloads?