Default reasoning occurs when the available information does not deductively guarantee the truth of the conclusion; and the conclusion is nonetheless correctly arrived at. The formalisms that have been developed in Artificial Intelligence to capture this mode of reasoning have suffered from a lack of agreement as to which non-monotonic inferences should be considered correct; and so Lifschitz 1989 produced a set of “Nonmonotonic Benchmark Problems” which all future formalisms are supposed to honor. The present work investigates the extent to which humans follow the prescriptions set out in these Benchmark Problems.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,797
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasoning.Lance J. Rips - 2002 - In J. Wixted & H. Pashler (eds.), Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology. Wiley.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Generics, Prevalence, and Default Inferences.Sangeet Khemlani, Sarah-Jane Leslie & Sam Glucksberg - 2009 - Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society:443--8.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
26 ( #407,146 of 2,425,667 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #546,862 of 2,425,667 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes