Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

Erkenntnis 78 (5):977-978 (2013)
Abstract
In earlier work, I have argued that self-referential assertions of the form ‘this assertion is improper’ are paradoxical for the truth account of assertion. In this paper, I argue that such assertions are also paradoxical, though in a different way, for the knowledge account of assertion
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9360-0
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.

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Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
The Nought Belief Paradox.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):523-529.

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