Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

Erkenntnis 78 (5):977-978 (2013)
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Abstract

In earlier work, I have argued that self-referential assertions of the form ‘this assertion is improper’ are paradoxical for the truth account of assertion. In this paper, I argue that such assertions are also paradoxical, though in a different way, for the knowledge account of assertion

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Charlie Pelling
University of Reading (PhD)

Citations of this work

Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.
Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
The Logic of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Julian J. Schlöder - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):49-57.
The Nought Belief Paradox.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):523-529.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.

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