Facts and truth-making

Topoi 29 (2):137-145 (2010)
This essay is a reflection on the idea of truth-making and its applications. I respond to a critique of my 1986 paper on truth-making and discuss some key principles at play in the Truth-maker Program as it has emerged over the past 25 years, paying special attention to negative and general truths. I maintain my opposition to negative and general facts, but give an improved account of how to do without them. In the end, I accept Truth-maker Maximalism and a weakened form of Truth-maker Necessitarianism, reject the assumption that truth-makers must be entities, and urge that the idea of a truth-maker be broadened and loosened so that it applies to anti-realistic as well as realistic truths.
Keywords Anti-realism  Fact  Generality  Negation  Realism  Truth  Truth-maker
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-009-9073-4
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Truthmaking and Difference-Making.David Lewis - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):602–615.

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Citations of this work BETA
A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism.Jamin Asay - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.

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