How to Be a Normative Expressivist

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):182-207 (2009)
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Abstract

Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does full justice to the core expressivist thesis that, at bottom, a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief.

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Michael Pendlebury
North Carolina State University

Citations of this work

Irreducibly Normative Properties.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10:216–244.
Facts and Truth-Making.Michael Pendlebury - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):137-145.
‘Ought’: The correct intention account.Heath White - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):297-317.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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