Inquiry 33 (2):215-30 (1990)
A number of philosophers are committed to the view that sense experiences, in so far as they have contents, have propositional contents, but this is more often tacitly accepted than argued for in the literature. This paper explains the propositional account and presents a basic case in support of it in a simple and straightforward way which does not involve commitment to any specific philosophical theory of perception
|Keywords||Metaphysics Perception Proposition Psychology|
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References found in this work BETA
Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Perception, Belief, and the Structure of Physical Objects and Consciousness.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1977 - Synthese 35 (3):285 - 351.
Citations of this work BETA
The Represented Object of Color Experience.Elizabeth Schier - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):1 – 27.
Sensibility and Understanding in Perceptual Judgments.Michael J. Pendlebury - 1999 - South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):356-369.
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