Sense experiences and their contents: A defense of the propositional account

Inquiry 33 (2):215-30 (1990)
A number of philosophers are committed to the view that sense experiences, in so far as they have contents, have propositional contents, but this is more often tacitly accepted than argued for in the literature. This paper explains the propositional account and presents a basic case in support of it in a simple and straightforward way which does not involve commitment to any specific philosophical theory of perception
Keywords Metaphysics  Perception  Proposition  Psychology
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DOI 10.1080/00201749008602219
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References found in this work BETA
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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Citations of this work BETA
Do Experiences Represent?Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Inquiry 53 (1):87-103.
The Represented Object of Color Experience.Elizabeth Schier - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):1 – 27.
Sensibility and Understanding in Perceptual Judgments.Michael J. Pendlebury - 1999 - South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):356-369.

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