Carlo Penco
University of Genoa
In this paper [submitted in 2008] I discuss the relation between truth and assertion. But the paper was never published, because the journal did not start (I don't know whether it started with another name and I wish all the best for this enterprise). After a while, I realized that what I had written was unclear and I tried to re-write with more details for "Agora filosofica". In this new paper I discuss in detail Kripke's example presented as a case against Donnellan's distinction, and I claim that one of the two dialogues breaks Grice's Cooperation principle (and,in general, the charity principle).
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Descriptions.S. Neale - 1996 - Critica 28 (83):97-129.
Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference.Saul Kripke - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):255-276.

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Similar books and articles

Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference.Saul A. Kripke - 1977 - In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Language. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 255-296.
Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion.Patrick Greenough - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.


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