Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):221-223 (2009)

Abstract
We are big fans of propositions. But we are not big fans of the proposed by Mitchell et al. The authors ignore the critical role played by implicit, non-inferential processes in biological cognition, overestimate the work that propositions alone can do, and gloss over substantial differences in how different kinds of animals and different kinds of cognitive processes approximate propositional representations
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X09001113
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From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory.Patricia W. Cheng - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):367-405.

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