Do Sensorimotor Dynamics Extend the Conscious Mind?

Adaptive Behavior (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


According to the extended conscious mind thesis (ECM), the physical basis of consciousness is not confined exclusively to the brain, but extends beyond it via sensorimotor dynamics. ECM is enjoying growing support among philosophers inspired by developments in enactive and embodied cognitive science. ECM has obvious parallels with the extended mind thesis (EM), according to which the physical basis of cognition is likewise not confined to the brain. However, EM’s originator and most prominent defender, Andy Clark, argues that EM theorists can and should reject ECM, and offers an alternative internalist account which admits a causal but non-constitutive role for sensorimotor dynamics. In this paper I examine how well this claim fits with some of the key commitments of EM, and the implications for the EM theorist who wishes to deny ECM. I argue that Clark’s position –ECM-rejecting EM –is untenable, and defend the ECM interpretation of sensorimotor dynamics.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,088

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Sketch this: extended mind and consciousness extension.Victor Loughlin - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):41-50.
Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis.Katalin Farkas - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):435-447.
The Mind Ain't Just in the Head-Defending and Extending the Extended Mind.Terence Sullivan - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:145-149.
The Extended Self.Eric T. Olson - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):481-495.
Vision as dance? Three challenges for sensorimotor contingency theory.Andy Clark - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
Cognitive systems and the supersized mind. [REVIEW]Robert D. Rupert - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):427 - 436.
Keeping the collectivity in mind?Harry Collins, Andy Clark & Jeff Shrager - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):353-374.


Added to PP

92 (#174,849)

6 months
1 (#1,149,473)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ken Pepper
University of York

Citations of this work

Phenomenological constraints: a problem for radical enactivism.Michael Roberts - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):375-399.
The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality.Cody Turner - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):747-774.
Meditation, enactivism and introspective training.Michael David Roberts - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references