Filo-Sofija 41 (2):73-92 (2018)

Marek A. Pepliński
University of Gdansk
This article presents Alvin Plantinga’s views on epistemic justification. The first part situates Plantinga’s epistemological views in the context of his epistemology of religion and debates of general epistemology. The second part discusses Plantinga’s argument that the internalism of 20th century epistemology stems from deontologism and that the views on the epistemic justification of analytic philosophers reflect the relationship between classical deontologism and classical internalism. The last part points to the objections with which the Plantinga’s conception met and tries to balance the depth and weakness of its position.
Keywords Epistemic Justification  Warrant  Alvin Plantinga  Theory of Knowledge  Cleassical Deontologism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709-727.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Warrant and Analysis.Joel Pust - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):51–57.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Alvin Plantinga.Deane-Peter Baker (ed.) - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
The Apologetical Implications of Alvin Plantinga's Epistemology.K. Scott Oliphint - 1994 - Dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary
Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability.R. Otte - 2006 - Synthese 152 (1):81-93.


Added to PP index

Total views
48 ( #194,950 of 2,331,149 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #82,197 of 2,331,149 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes