An argument for temporalism and contingentism

Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1387-1417 (2015)

Caleb Perl
Australian Catholic University
Aristotle and Aquinas may have held that the things we believe and assert can have different truth-values at different times. Stoic logicians did; they held that there were “vacillating assertibles”—assertibles that are sometimes true and sometimes false. Frege and Russell endorsed the now widely accepted alternative, where the propositions believed and asserted are always specific with respect to time. This paper brings a new perspective to this question. We want to figure out what sorts of propositions speakers believe. Some philosophers have argued that we must take agents to believe temporalist propositions—propositions that are inspecific with respect to time—if we’re to explain the agent’s own thoughts and inferences. I’ll explore another strategy. I’ll focus on our ability to think and reason about the beliefs that other people have. I’ll suggest that an adequate account of that ability requires that we take others to believe some temporalist propositions. I also ask whether all propositions can be specific with respect to worlds, and close by exploring some general issues
Keywords Temporalism  Eternalism  Contingentism  Necessitarianism  Propositions  Truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0355-3
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,330
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mere Formalities: Normative Fictions and Normative Authority.Daniel Wodak - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Necessitarian Propositions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):119-162.
Stoic Disagreement and Belief Retention.Michael Rieppel - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):243-262.
On Fineness of Grain.Jeffrey C. King - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):763-781.
Compositionality and Structured Propositions.Lorraine Juliano Keller & John A. Keller - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):313-323.
Logic: The Stoics (Part One).Susanne Bobzien - 1999 - In Keimpe Algra & et al (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.


Added to PP index

Total views
84 ( #105,485 of 2,291,031 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #119,572 of 2,291,031 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature