A Consciência De Si Como Sujeito: Série 2 / The self-consciousness as subject

Kant E-Prints 4:229-265 (2009)
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: In this paper, I present a new interpretation for Kant’s notion of a consciousness of oneself as Subject on behalf of a polemic with a recent reading suggested by Longuenesse . My central aim is to provide a systematic interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of consciousness in general. I present and defend new interpretations for four capital Kant’s notions. First, I present a reading of Kant’s sensible intuition as a de re form of mental representation without a conceptual content and without any structure. It makes the subject aware only in the limited sense of demonstratively representing of what appears to him. In the sequence, I present a reading of empirical consciousness as the result of a first-order representation. The important introduction of §16 of the first Critique is construed here as expressing what is known today as the access consciousness. Lastly, I propose a new reading for the transcendental Apperception as an intransitive form of consciousness



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Roberto Horácio De Pereira
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

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