A Consciência De Si Como Sujeito: Série 2 / The self-consciousness as subject

Kant E-Prints 4:229-265 (2009)
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Abstract

In this paper, I present a new interpretation of Kant’s notion of consciousness of oneself as a Subject on behalf of a polemic with a recent reading suggested by Longuenesse. My central aim is to provide a systematic interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of consciousness in general. I present and defend new interpretations for four capital Kant’s notions. First, I present a reading of Kant’s sensible intuition as a de re form of mental representation without conceptual content and any structure. It makes the subject aware only in the limited sense of demonstratively representing what appears to him. In the sequence, I present a reading of empirical consciousness as the result of a first-order representation. The important introduction of §16 of the first Critique is construed here as expressing what is known today as the access consciousness. Lastly, I propose a new reading for the transcendental Apperception as an intransitive form of consciousness

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Roberto Horácio De Pereira
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

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References found in this work

Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Henry E. Allison - 1988 - Yale University Press.
Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
Belief De Re.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (6):338-362.

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