A note on Lewis on counterfactual dependence in a chancy world

Analysis 59 (3):165–173 (1999)
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Abstract

In a Postscript, David Lewis tries to extend results obtained in his "Time's Arrow and Counterfactual Dependence" from the deterministic case to the indeterministic one. In particular, he claims that under the supposition that the actual world is indeterministic, the truth of the counterfactual 'If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust' is reconciled with his truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals by a certain refinement of his earlier treatment. Sections II and III explain why his claim is mistaken. Section IV remarks why his matters

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Philip Percival
Nottingham University

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