Awareness of one's body as subject and object

Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):70-76 (1999)

Ingmar Persson
Oxford University
This paper rejects Hume's famous claim that we never perceive our selves, by arguing that, under conditions specified, our perception of our bodies is perception of our selves. It takes as its point of departure Quassim Cassam's defence of a position to a similar effect but puts a different interpretation on the distinction between perceiving the body as an object, having spatial attributes, and perceiving it as a self or subject of experiences
Keywords Body  Metaphysics  Mind  Object  Subject  Cassam, Q  Hume
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DOI 10.1080/13869799908520966
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References found in this work BETA

Self-Reference and Self-Awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
Self and World.Quassim Cassam - 1997 - Oxford University Press UK.

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