Ambiguity when playing coordination games across cultures

Theory and Decision 90 (3-4):485-505 (2020)
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Abstract

Cultural differences can be a source of ambiguity in coordination games. As players are likely to experience more ambiguity when playing a different culture, we expect players to choose safer strategies. We run experiments with a stag hunt and bargaining coordination game. Using a between-subjects design, we vary the identity of the opponent between someone of the same culture or a different culture. We compare the responses of British and East Asian students at the University of Exeter and show the cultural identity of the opponent by physical appearance. While we find no significant differences between treatments for East Asians, the British choose the safer option in the stag hunt and demand more of the pie in the bargaining game when faced with an opponent from a different culture.

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