Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):509-25 (1997)

I argue that consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its ability to deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of noting and correcting the agent's errors, as actions performed by itself. This in turn requires a robust self-concept as part of the agent's world model; the appropriate notion of self here is a special one, allowing for a very strong kind of self-reference. It also requires the capability to come to see that world model as residing in its belief base , while then representing the actual world as possibly different, i.e., forming a new world-model. This suggests particular computational mechanisms by which consciousness occurs, ones that conceivably could be discovered by neuroscientists, as well as built into artificial systems that may need such capabilities. Consciousness, then, is not an epiphenomenon at all, but rather a key part of the functional architecture of suitably intelligent agents, hence amenable to study as much as any other architectural feature. I also argue that ignorance of how subjective states could be essentially functional does not itself lend credibility to the view that such states are not essentially functional; the strong self-reference proposal here is one possible functional explanation of consciousness
Keywords Consciousness  Function  Intelligence  Metaphysics  Qualia  Reference
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References found in this work BETA

'I' = Awareness.Arthur Deikman - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):350-56.

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Citations of this work BETA

Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness.Drew McDermott - 2007 - In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 117--150.
Robots With Internal Models A Route to Machine Consciousness?Owen Holland & Rod Goodman - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):4-5.
The Roots of Self-Awareness.Michael L. Anderson & Donald R. Perlis - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):297-333.
What Puts the “Meta” in Metacognition?Michael L. Anderson & Don Perlis - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):138-139.

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