Conceptual content and unattended visual features

Ideas Y Valores 58 (140):119-141 (2009)
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Abstract

McDowell (1994) proposed a philosophical theory about perceptual content -call it "conceptualism"- that states that in every case the content of a visual experience necessarily involves concepts that fully specify every single feature consciously and simultaneously available during the experience. I..

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Francisco Pereira
Universidad Alberto Hurtado

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