Synthese 118 (2):257-277 (1999)
The Quine/Putnam indispensability approach to the confirmation of mathematical theories in recent times has been the subject of significant criticism. In this paper I explore an alternative to the Quine/Putnam indispensability approach. I begin with a van Fraassen-like distinction between accepting the adequacy of a mathematical theory and believing in the truth of a mathematical theory. Finally, I consider the problem of moving from the adequacy of a mathematical theory to its truth. I argue that the prospects for justifying this move are qualitatively worse in mathematics than they are in science.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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Confirmational Holism and its Mathematical (W)Holes.Anthony Peressini - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):102-111.
Mathematical Naturalism: Origins, Guises, and Prospects. [REVIEW]Bart Van Kerkhove - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (1-2):5-39.
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