Conceptual structure and the individuation of content

Philosophical Perspectives 9:401-428 (1995)
Current attempts to understand psychological content divide into two families of views. According to externalist accounts such as those advanced by Tyler Burge and Ruth Millikan, psychological content does not supervene on the physical features of the individual subject, but is fixed partially by the nature of the world external to her.1 In the rival functional role theories developed by Ned Block and Brian Loar, content does supervene on the physical features of the individual, and is, in addition, determined solely by the role it plays in the causal network of an individual's sensations, behavior, and mental states.2 Over the past fifteen years, criticism of these two types of views has often focussed on their capacity to individuate content in an acceptable way, and both seem to be deficient in this respect
Keywords Content  Individuation  Logic  Structure
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2214228
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,106
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Content, Computation and Externalism.Oron Shagrir - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):369-400.
Social Content and Psychological Content.Brian Loar - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
Thought and Syntax.William E. Seager - 1992 - Philosophy of Science Association 1992:481-491.
Narrow Mental Content.Curtis Brown - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
In Defence of Non-Conceptual Content.Simone Gozzano - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.
Narrow Content.Robert Stalnaker - 1990 - In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: Csli.
Kantian Non-Conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

37 ( #139,839 of 2,171,799 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #326,702 of 2,171,799 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums