Philosophical Perspectives 9:401-428 (1995)
Current attempts to understand psychological content divide into two families of views. According to externalist accounts such as those advanced by Tyler Burge and Ruth Millikan, psychological content does not supervene on the physical features of the individual subject, but is fixed partially by the nature of the world external to her.1 In the rival functional role theories developed by Ned Block and Brian Loar, content does supervene on the physical features of the individual, and is, in addition, determined solely by the role it plays in the causal network of an individual's sensations, behavior, and mental states.2 Over the past fifteen years, criticism of these two types of views has often focussed on their capacity to individuate content in an acceptable way, and both seem to be deficient in this respect
|Keywords||Content Individuation Logic Structure|
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Citations of this work BETA
Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
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