Colours with a Humean face

Philosophia 4 (1):128-144 (2003)
Abstract
In this article it will be argued that a Humean, projectivist theory of colour can be held consistent and plausible. This can be done without selling out to cognitivist intuitions about colours if the distinction between an everyday and a metalevel is upheld. The distinction, it will be argued, is both natural and philosophically uncomplicated
Keywords Color  Dispositionalism  Epistemology  Projection  Hume
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DOI 10.1515/SATS.2003.128
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References found in this work BETA
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Another Look at the Colors.Colin McGinn - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (11).

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