Philosophia 4 (1):128-144 (2003)
In this article it will be argued that a Humean, projectivist theory of colour can be held consistent and plausible. This can be done without selling out to cognitivist intuitions about colours if the distinction between an everyday and a metalevel is upheld. The distinction, it will be argued, is both natural and philosophically uncomplicated
|Keywords||Color Dispositionalism Epistemology Projection Hume|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Unmasking and Dispositionalism: Reply to Mark Johnston.Barry G. Stroud - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):202-212.
Novel Colours and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.
The Simple View of Colour.John Campbell - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color. MIT Press. pp. 177-90.
Précis of Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy.P. J. E. Kail - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (1):61-65.
A Simple View of Colour.John Campbell - 1993 - In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. Oxford University Press. pp. 257-268.
Gilding and Staining and the Significance of Our Moral Sentiments.Jacqueline Taylor - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (1):89-95.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #296,455 of 2,164,828 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #348,012 of 2,164,828 )
How can I increase my downloads?