Can't we all just be compatibilists?: A critical study of John Martin Fischer's my way [Book Review]

Journal of Ethics 12 (2):157 - 166 (2008)
My aim in this study is not to praise Fischer's fine theory of moral responsibility, but to (try to) bury the "semi" in "semicompatibilism". I think Fischer gives the Consequence Argument (CA) too much credit, and gives himself too little credit. In his book, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer gave the CA as good a statement as it will ever get, and put his finger on what is wrong with it. Then he declared stalemate rather than victory. In my view, Fischer's view amounts to sophisticated compatibilism. It would be nice to be able to call it by its right name. In The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer develops his own version of Consequence Argument, which turns on two principles, one of which is the fixity of the past. FP: For any action K, agent S and time i, if it is true that is S were to do Y at t, some fact about that past relative to t would not have been a fact, then S cannot at t do Fat 1. 1 argue that the equipment needed to reject FP (and thereby defend the most plausible version of compatibilism) is needed to deal with the problem of fatalism. In addition, I argue that the rejection of FP is compatible with Fischer's approach to Frankfurt cases and with his account of transfer principles
Keywords Back-tracking conditionals  Consequence Argument  Fatalism  John Martin Fischer  Harry G. Frankfurt  Regulative control  Transfer principles
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Stalnaker (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Andrew M. Bailey (2012). Incompatibilism and the Past. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
Yishai Cohen (2015). Molinists Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.

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