Defending hard incompatibilism

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247 (2005)
Authors
Derk Pereboom
Cornell University
Abstract
In _Living Without Free Will_, I develop and argue for a view according to which our being morally responsible would be ruled out if determinism were true, and also if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively events.1 Absent agent causation, indeterministic causal histories are as threatening to moral responsibility as deterministic histories are, and a generalization argument from manipulation cases shows that deterministic histories indeed undermine moral responsibility. Agent causation has not been ruled out as a coherent possibility, but it is not credible given our best physical theories. Hence we must take seriously the prospect that we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility. I call the resulting view _hard incompatibilism_. Furthermore, contrary to widespread belief, a conception of life without free will would not at all be devastating to morality or to our sense of meaning in life, and in certain respects it may even be beneficial
Keywords Alternative  Determinism  Ethics  Free Will  Incompatibilism  Intention  Moral Responsibility  Possibility  Frankfurt, Harry
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DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2005.00114.x
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A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.
Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):263-286.
Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.
In Defence of the Four-Case Argument.Benjamin Matheson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1963-1982.

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