Evading the Slingshot

In J. Ezquerro A. Clark (ed.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning. Kluwer Academic Publishers (1996)
The topic of this essay is “the slingshot,” a short argument that purports to show that sentences1 designate (stand for, refer to) truth values. Versions of this argument have been used by Frege 2, Church 3, Quine4 and Davidson5; thus it is historically important, even if it immediately strikes one as fishy. The argument turns on two principles, which I call substitution and redistribution. In “Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations,”6 Jon Barwise and I rejected both principles, as part of our attempt..
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
How Wittgenstein Escapes the Slingshot.A. C. Genova - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:1-22.
Extensional and Non-Truth-Functional Contexts.Adam Morton - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):159-164.
Shallow Analysis and the Slingshot Argument.Michael Baumgartner - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):531-556.
Barwise, Perry, and Quine's Slingshot Argument.Andrew Ward - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):141-146.
One Way to Face Facts.Greg Restall - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):420–426.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
256 ( #14,949 of 2,211,068 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #14,791 of 2,211,068 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature