Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529 (2019)

Authors
Timothy Perrine
Wuhan University
Abstract
Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
Keywords Epistemic Value  Value of Truth  Richard Feldman
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-019-00382-4
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References found in this work BETA

.R. G. Swinburne - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.

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