Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33 (2009)

Authors
Derk Pereboom
Cornell University
Abstract
In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.
Keywords Free will  Moral responsibility  Frankfurt-style case  Reasons-responsiveness
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9371-0
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References found in this work BETA

The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.

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Citations of this work BETA

Personal Autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Arguments for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry.Daniel Coren - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):145-159.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Hard Incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2007 - In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell.
Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again.Derk Pereboom - 2008 - In Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (eds.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 1--33.
Defending Hard Incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.
Revisionism About Free Will: A Statement and Defense.Manuel Vargas - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45-62.
Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Journal of Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 477-488.
The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will.Manuel Vargas - 2010 - In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave.

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