Intentionality and self-awareness

Ratio 16 (3):222-235 (2003)
Abstract
In this essay I defend both the individual plausibility and conjoint consistency of two theses. One is the Intentionality Thesis: that all mental states are intentional . The other is the Self-Awareness Thesis: that if a subject is aware of an object, then the subject is also aware of being aware of that object. I begin by arguing for the individual prima facie plausibility of both theses. I then go on to consider a regress argument to the effect that the two theses are incompatible. I discuss three responses to that argument, and defend one of them
Keywords Intentionality  Mental States  Metaphysics  Regress  Self-awareness
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00219
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References found in this work BETA
Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions.John Deigh - 1994 - Ethics 104 (4):824-54.
Self-Intimation, Memory and Personal Identity.Jonardon Ganeri - 1999 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 27 (5):469-483.

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Citations of this work BETA
Intentionality: Some Lessons From the History of the Problem From Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.
Consciousness and Self-Awareness.Chien-Hsing Ho - 2007 - Asian Philosophy 17 (3):213 – 230.

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