Indices of truth and temporal propositions

Philosophical Quarterly 39 (155):190-199 (1989)
This paper is in three sections. In the first I describe and illustrate three uses of indices of truth in semantics. The way I illustrate this classification is not completely uncontroversial, but I expect that my intuitions on this matter are generally shared. In the second section I broach a question which is central to the metaphysics of time, namely: how should certain temporal indices of truth - times - be fitted within this classificatory scheme? I sketch three proposals as to how this might be done, and show how they constitute different metaphysical conceptions of the nature of time. Finally, in the third section I turn to a specific problem with the classification of times (as indices of truth) I call 'non-indexical'. Mellor (1981) thinks this problem insoluble, and argues that it shows this classification to be absurd. However, by appealing to the modal analogues of the issues involved, I first show that Mellor's argument is question- begging, and then go on to show how the non-indexical classification of times might undermine the presuppositions on which his argument rests. The paper attempts to contribute to a discussion of the question raised in section II, not to provide a definitive answer to it.
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DOI 10.2307/2219638
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Knowability, Actuality, and the Metaphysics of Context-Dependence.Philip Percival - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):82 – 97.
Are Contingent Facts a Myth?A. A. Rini - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):424 - 431.
A Presentist's Refutation of Mellor's McTaggart.Philip Percival - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:91-.
Thank Goodness That's Non-Actual.Philip Percival - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (3):191-213.

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