Neuroethics 13 (1):87-97 (2020)

Authors
Derk Pereboom
Cornell University
Abstract
The aim of this article is to set out a theory for treatment of criminals that rejects retributive justification for punishment; does not fall afoul of a plausible prohibition on using people merely as means; and actually works in the real world. The theory can be motivated by free will skepticism. But it can also be supported without reference to the free will issue, since retributivism faces ethical challenges in its own right. In past versions of the account I’ve emphasized the quarantine analogy for incapacitation together with the value of rehabilitation and reintegration. Here I pay special attention to the permissibility and the limits of general deterrence.
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DOI 10.1007/s12152-018-9382-7
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References found in this work BETA

Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Gary Watson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (9):517-522.
Moral Blame and Moral Protest.Angela Smith - 2013 - In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Duties, Desert, and the Justification of Punishment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):425-438.

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